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Jones v. Robbins: The Rhyme and Reason of Duty–
Risk 
Thomas E. Richard∗ 
We start with Leon’s1 learned books2 
That prompted Wex3 to take a look4 
At negligence analysis, 
And what we know as duty–risk.5 
 
The teachings of these pedagogues 
Spawned David6 and his Dialogues7 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by THOMAS E. RICHARD. 
 ∗ Clyde C. Tidwell Endowed Professor of Law, Southern University Law 
Center. The author greatly appreciates the kind support and encouragement of 
Hodge O’Neal, III of the Monroe, Louisiana Bar, Professor Paul R. Baier of the 
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, and Professor Baier’s 
wife, Barbara Baier, of the Baton Rouge, Louisiana Bar who read an earlier draft 
of this work. 
 1. Leon A. Green (1888–1979), late Professor of Law, University of 
Texas, and former Dean, Northwestern University School of Law, is the creative 
force behind the duty–risk analysis. 
 2. See generally LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); 
LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN 
TORT CASES (1931). 
 3. Wex S. Malone (1906–1986), late Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana 
State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, espoused and refined the duty–risk 
analysis and enriched the lives of his torts students through his instruction. 
 4. By letter dated January 13, 1936, to Leon Green, a copy of which is in 
the author’s possession, Wex Malone, a young torts professor at the University 
of Mississippi, acknowledged having met Leon Green at the 1936 Association of 
American Law Schools meeting in New Orleans and expressed a desire to adopt 
Green’s casebook for use in his torts class. 
 5. Leon Green’s method of negligence analysis utilizes cause in fact, duty, 
scope of duty, breach, and damages to eliminate the obfuscatory language of 
proximate cause. James M. Treece, Leon Green and the Judicial Process: 
Government of the People, by the People, and for the People, 56 TEX. L. REV. 
447, 459 (1978); William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort—Greenian, as 
Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been Influenced by Malone—A Primer, 22 LOY. 
L. REV. 903–06, 912, 916 (1976), reprinted in William L. Crowe, Sr., The 
Anatomy of a Tort—Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been 
Influenced by Malone—A Primer, 44 LOY. L. REV. 647 (1999); Leon Green, The 
Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 546 (1962). 
 6. David W. Robertson, W. Page Keeton Chair in Tort Law, University 
Distinguished Teaching Professor, University of Texas School of Law, is a 
former student of Wex Malone, a former colleague of Leon Green, and a 
renowned torts scholar in his own right. 
 7. David W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: 
Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
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About the celebrated Hill,8 
A case that lives within us still.9 
 
But there’s one case that’s even dearer 
With analysis that’s even clearer. 
It sends the duty–risk heart throbbin’. 
It’s the case of Jones v. Robbins.10 
 
Robbins sold four cents of gas 
To Penny, a six-year-old lass.11 
She took the gas home after sale 
And placed it on a water well.12 
 
Four-year-old Candy13 did dispatch 
Into the gas a well-struck match. 
The flames burned hot, and we learned sadly 
The fire burned Candy rather badly.14 
 
Candy’s suit was based in tort 
In DeSoto Parish court.15 
‘Though she lost, she was not shaken, 
To Shreveport an appeal was taken.16 
 
                                                                                                             
 8. Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972). Although 
previous Louisiana Supreme Court duty–risk decisions had been rendered, Hill 
was the first Louisiana Supreme Court duty–risk decision to employ a non-
statutory duty. See id.; see also THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., HILL V. LUNDIN & 
ASSOCIATES REVISITED: DUTY RISKED TO DEATH (1993). 
 9. Hill, 256 So. 2d 620 is frequently cited as authority in Louisiana cases 
and is included for study in torts textbooks. See, e.g., FRANK L. MARAIST, ET 
AL., TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 211–13 (2d ed. 
2012). 
 10. 289 So. 2d 104 (La. 1974). 
 11. Id. at 106. Henry Robbins owned, and George Robbins managed, the 
Robbins Gulf Service Station in Mansfield, Louisiana. George Robbins either 
sold four cents of gas or gave a small amount of gas to six-year-old Penny 
Wyatt. Id. at 105–06. 
 12. Id. at 106. 
 13. Id. Candy Jones is the half-sister of Penny Wyatt. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. Candy’s father, Willie Leon Jones, filed suit on behalf of his minor 
daughter in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, DeSoto Parish, Louisiana. Id. at 
104–05. 
 16. Appeal was filed in the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, Shreveport, 
Louisiana. Id. at 105. 
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When her appeal was soon denied,17 
To the Supremes writs were applied. 
A smile returned to Candy’s face, 
When they ordered up her case.18 
 
Oral arguments were tendered;  
Followed by decision rendered.19 
Opinion couched in language brisk 
Applied pure Greenian duty–risk.20 
 
Where did it start? How did it end? 
Saul would say, “Let’s see, my friend.” 21 
The opinion’s author, Barham, J.22 
Wrote cause in fact must start the fray.23 
 
The gasoline that Robbins sold  
Burned and hurt the four year old. 
Thus, the sale of gas must be 
A cause of Candy’s injury.24 
 
Now having found a cause in fact, 
The opinion took a different tack 
                                                                                                             
 17. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the 
defendants. Jones v. Robbins, 275 So. 2d 812, 816 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1973). 
 18. Writs were granted. Jones v. Robbins, 277 So. 2d 671 (La. 1973). 
 19. Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d at 104, was decided January 14, 1974.  
 20. See Treece, supra note 5, at 459; Crowe, supra note 5, at 904; Green, 
supra note 5, at 546.  
 21. Saul Litvinoff, late Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University 
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, referred to everyone as “my friend.” 
 22. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 105. Justice Mack E. Barham was an Associate 
Justice on the Supreme Court of Louisiana from 1968 to 1974. 
 23. Id. at 106. Cause in fact, the causal connection issue, is the initial issue 
to be decided in duty–risk analysis. Treece, supra note 5, at 459; Crowe, supra 
note 5, at 904; Green, supra note 5, at 549. 
 24. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 106. Justice Barham’s discussion of cause in fact 
asks if the sale of the gasoline to six-year-old Penny “ha[d] something to do 
with” the burns suffered by four-year-old Candy. Id. This analysis is more in 
line with Leon Green’s views on cause in fact rather than Wex Malone’s. Green 
believed that cause in fact is nothing more than a factual determination, free 
from any evaluation of right or wrong, that the defendant’s conduct contributed 
to the victim’s harm. Green, supra note 5, at 548. Malone, on the other hand, 
professed that cause in fact is a policy and fact-driven process requiring the trier 
of fact to engage in matters of evaluation and judgment. Id.; Wex S. Malone, 
Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 60 (1956). 
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Offering an explanation 
About the duty’s bifurcation.25 
 
This issue was a legal beauty.26 
Did the Robbins owe a duty 
To protect four-year-old Candy 
From a risk that might be handy?27 
 
A prudent person it would seem  
Would not sell the gasoline 
To a child who might not know 
That up in flames the gas would go.28 
 
Although this duty is “good stuff,”29 
Finding it is not enough.30 
Duty’s more important question: 
What’s the scope of its protection?31 
 
Now Wex signals this alarm 
No duty saves one from all harms. 
Only certain risks sometime 
Are within the duty’s rhyme.32 
 
                                                                                                             
 25. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107. In the duty–risk analysis, once defendant’s 
conduct is determined to be a cause in fact of the victim’s injury, the next step in 
the analysis is the duty issue. This is a bifurcated issue determining (1) if 
defendant owes a duty and (2) if so, the scope of protection of that duty. Crowe, 
supra note 5, at 905–06. 
 26. The duty issue in duty–risk analysis is generally a legal issue decided by 
the judge. See Allen E. Smith, Some Realism About a Grand Legal Realist, 56 
TEX. L. REV. 479, 491 (1978). 
 27. The opinion uses the phrase “in the hands of” six times in a single page. 
Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107. 
 28. Id. 
 29. George W. Pugh, Emeritus Professor of Law, Louisiana State 
University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, frequently referred to jurisprudence and 
legal reasoning that he regarded highly as “good stuff.” 
 30. The determination that a defendant owes a legal duty to a victim does 
not fully satisfy the duty issue. The second and more important part of the duty 
issue is whether the duty provides protection to this victim from this risk of 
harm arising in this manner. See Crowe, supra note 5, at 906; Green, supra note 
5, at 546. 
 31. Id. See also Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107. 
 32. Malone, supra note 24, at 73. Although intended by Malone to be 
applicable to cause in fact, the principle has been extended judicially to the 
scope of the duty issue. See Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 
(La. 1972). 
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So the Court was forced to ask: 
Does a duty to not sell gas 
To a child of tender years 
Protect ‘gainst burns encountered here?33 
 
One through ease of association34 
Should understand a conflagration 
Could result from children’s play  
Misusing gasoline that day.35 
 
A prudent one with care aplenty 
Would not have sold the gas to Penny. 
The very risk that harmed poor Candy 
Was in the duty plain and dandy.36 
 
With most of duty–risk now reached 
The Court asked was the duty breached?37 
This question of liability: 
Did Robbins act unreasonably?38 
 
Robbins breached the duty owed. 
This was fault as per the Code39 
Both for George and his brother.40 
Thus, poor Candy could recover. 
 
                                                                                                             
 33. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107. 
 34. Id. Ease of association is one of several socioeconomic factors that may 
be considered, either consciously or subconsciously, by the court in determining 
duty and its scope. Ease of association asks whether the injury or harm sustained 
by the victim is easily associated with the conduct of a defendant that violates 
the duty owed. See Crowe, supra note 5, at 906; Robertson, supra note 7, at 9. 
 35. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 108. 
 36. Id. The precise risk that Candy encountered, the risk of being burned by 
the gasoline possessed by her half-sister, Penny, was exactly the type of risk the 
duty was intended to protect against. Id. at 107–08. 
 37. Id. at 108. 
 38. See Crowe supra note 5, at 912. Justice Barham’s opinion indicates that 
“a determination of negligence and liability” is only reached after a finding that 
defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of the victim’s harm and that defendant 
“owed a legal duty which encompassed the particular risk that caused the harm.” 
Jones, 289 So. 2d at 106. 
 39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (1961). 
 40. Id. arts. 2315 (1961), 2316, 2320 (1870). George Robbins’ fault arises 
under articles 2315 and 2316. Under article 2320, Henry Robbins is vicariously 
liable for the tort committed by his employee–brother, George, who, in the 
course and scope of employment, negligently sold gasoline to six-year-old 
Penny Wyatt. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 108. 
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Just one last matter to address: 
How much damage to assess? 
This task the Second Circuit landed 
When the matter was remanded.41 
 
Some judges disagreed with Mack.42 
Sure, Robbins was a cause in fact.43 
But duty owed? Dissenters laughed. 
Wasn’t this case like Palsgraf?44 
 
George Robbins gas to Penny sold. 
To Candy he no duty owed.45 
Another thing that seemed to chafe; 
Was Robbins bound to keep her safe? 
 
Surely one should recognize 
That mommy failed to supervise.46 
And so dissenters had their say, 
But they did not win the day.47 
 
                                                                                                             
 41. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 108. On remand, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeal took into consideration the extent of Candy’s burns, scarring, and 
medical expenses, awarding $23,000 in general damages and $1,000 in special 
damages. Jones v. Robbins, 296 So. 2d 361, 363 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1974). The 
author was informed by Hodge O’Neal III, plaintiffs’ counsel, that the judgment 
was never paid. After receiving a draft of this rhyme, Mr. O’Neal replied, 
The victory was ever so thrilling 
Never was justice more willing 
But Robbins had not  
A window nor pot 
The rest of the story’s unfulfilling 
We never got a single shilling. 
 42. Justices Summers and Culpepper dissented. Justice Summers assigned 
written reasons. See Jones, 289 So. 2d at 108. 
 43. Applying the “but for” test, Justice Summers reasoned that but for the 
sale of gasoline by Robbins, Candy would not have been injured. Like the 
majority, Justice Summers also recognized that the existence of cause in fact did 
not establish defendants’ legal liability. Id. at 109. 
 44. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 45. Justice Summers argued that no direct duty was owed to Candy because 
Robbins’s substandard conduct, the sale of gasoline to an incompetent minor 
child, was directed solely toward Penny. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 109. 
 46. Justice Summers would place all fault for Candy’s injuries on Alberta 
Jones, Candy’s mother, the individual “most duty-bound to protect and 
supervise the child[].” Id. at 109. 
 47. The Court decided the case 5–2 in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. 
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When Jones v. Robbins48 was reported, 
Admiration was recorded. 
Bill Crowe took the lead, of course,49 
Then came Timmy’s “tour de force.”50 
 
Neither cared who won the case. 
What mattered was the Court embraced 
This method of analysis 
That we all know as duty–risk.51 
 
It’s been around for 50 years.52 
So raise your glass and give a cheer 
Duty–risk is still in season.53 
Now you know the rhyme and reason. 
  
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. 
 49. Crowe, supra note 5, at 903. 
 50. Timothy McNamara, The Duties and Risks of Duty-Risk Analysis, 44 
LA. L. REV. 1227 (1984). This exceptional piece, which skillfully discusses 
duty–risk methodology and its development in the jurisprudence of Louisiana, 
states that the Jones v. Robbins opinion “is a tour de force by the court and an 
excellent example of the methodology in action.” Id. at 1245. 
 51. Id.; Crowe, supra note 5, at 922. 
 52. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s seminal duty–risk decision was Dixie 
Drive-It-Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962). 
 53. Louisiana courts continue to utilize duty–risk analysis. See, e.g., 
Granger v. Christus Health Central La., No. 2012-C-1982, 2013 WL 3287128, at 
*41 (La. June 28, 2013); Joseph v. Dickerson, 754 So. 2d 912, 916 (La. 2000); 
Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1015 (La. 1993); Roberts v. 
Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1041–42 (La. 1991); Estate of Loveless ex rel. 
Loveless v. Gay, 945 So. 2d 233, 238 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006). Should these 
courts ever need to resort to a clear application of duty–risk methodology, Jones 
v. Robbins provides a sterling example. 
